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Introduction 
 
Cutting jobs in particular sections of a workplace has become part of usual 
management practice, even when overall demand at the workplace is rising.  This 
practice has been interpreted as reflecting competitive and financial market pressures 
on management (Standing, 1997; Cappelli, 1999).  These within-workplace job cuts 
are presumably of high concern to the employees in sections that are potentially 
affected, and to their unions.  The role of unions in relation to within-workplace job 
cuts has not previously been analysed, but there is substantial evidence, for both 
Britain and the USA that the presence of unions tends to reduce overall workplace 
employment (see Bryson, 2004 for a review) relative to its estimated level in the 
absence of unions.  Within-workplace job cuts may be stimulated by unions for the 
same reasons. At the same time, however, unions have often emphasised job security 
in their aims, and numerous agreements are on record to guarantee that compulsory 
redundancy will not be applied, or to underwrite job security in other ways (IRS, 
1997; Kelly, 2004).  Such agreements on first view appear to increase employers’ 
severance costs and so make within-workplace job cuts less probable. 
 
This article poses three questions.  Do unions increase the probability of within-
workplace job cuts (WWJCs), so adding to the evidence about unions and workplace 
employment?  Do unions increase the probability of job security guarantees (JSGs) 
being made by employers?  How are JSGs and WWJCs related?  The analysis uses 
workplace-level survey data that are representative of British workplaces with 10 or 
more employees in 1998, a period when job security was a salient issue.   
 
Unlike most of the literature on workplace employment, we consider both the market 
sector and the public sector, in parallel.  A policy-related reason for including the 
British public sector is that during the 1980s and 1990s it was heavily involved in 
workforce reduction (Morgan, Allington and Heery, 1999), yet has traditions of 
accepting and encouraging unionisation, which is almost universal there, and of 
offering long-term security to its employees (ibid.).  There is also a theoretical 
motivation for comparing the market and public sectors if one wishes to understand 
workplace employment decisions and the role of unions.  Because the public sector 
differs from the private through lack of a financial maximand, through prevalence of 
unions, and through distinctive forms and levels of bargaining, in some respects the 
two sectors should experience different effects of unionisation.  Current 
understandings of unions and employment in the market sector can be further tested 
through observations of the public sector. 
 
Since WWJCs by definition relate to sections of employees rather than to the whole 
workforce, one needs to show how union effects that are hypothesised to apply at the 
workplace level can be transferred to this lower level.  The article argues that the 
union effect, via labour costs, is more likely to apply at sub-workplace level not only 
when workplace unionisation is at a high or ‘strong’ level, but more specifically when 
multi-unionism rather than single unionism is present.  Additionally, it is argued that 
multi-unionism has a ‘union voice’ (Freeman and Medoff, 1984) interpretation.  This 
is particularly relevant for JSGs, where the article offers a simple framework for 
interpreting the employer’s decision. 
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In addition to its focus on unions, the analysis considers two additional variables that 
help to develop an interpretation of differences between the market and public sectors.  
These are the proportion of women employees at the workplace, and a new measure 
of monopoly position.  The interpretation of these variables will be explained further 
in the section on theory (see below). 
 
The remaining sections of the paper are as follows.  The next section briefly reviews 
the previous findings concerning unions, workplace employment, and job security.  
Section three presents a theoretical perspective and hypotheses.  Section four 
describes the data used and the variables constructed.  Section five explains the 
analysis issues and methods.  The results follow in section six, and the seventh and 
final section provides a discussion of the findings, and conclusions. 
 
 
2.  Previous Research on Unions, Workplace Employment and Job 
Security 
 
The literature on unions’ employment effects has focused on changes in workplace 
employment levels.  Studies tend to find that the average effect of union recognition is 
to lower employment growth by 2.5-4 per cent per annum relative to non-union 
workplaces, ceteris paribus (Blanchflower, Millward and Oswald, 1991; Machin and 
Wadhwani, 1991; Booth and McCullogh, 1999; Bryson, 2004; Addison and Belfield, 
2004).  Similar findings emerge from other countries (Leonard, 1992; Long, 1993; 
Wooden and Hawke, 2000).  This has led some analysts to refer to the employment 
effect of unions as the ‘one constant’ in studies of unions’ economic effects (Addison 
and Belfield, 2004).   
 
However, the evidence is not easy to interpret.  First, the effect is not apparent always 
and everywhere.  There is conflicting evidence on the union effect on employment 
growth in the late 1970s: Machin and Wadhwani (1991) identify a positive effect 
whereas Blanchflower et al. (1991) find a negative effect.  Second, in spite of 
evidence that this union effect occurs within industries (Bryson, 2004) some have 
questioned whether it is a causal effect of unionisation (Metcalf, 2005: 100).  Third, 
whereas some studies estimate the average effect of union recognition on changes in 
employment levels, some studies find union effects differ according to the nature of 
unionisation and the conditions facing the firm.  In particular, union effects differ with 
union bargaining strength and the scope of bargaining.  In the United States (Freeman 
and Kleiner, 1999) and Australia (Wooden and Hawke, 2000), it appears that union 
effects in slowing the rate of employment growth are more pronounced where unions 
have greater bargaining power, as proxied by union density.1  This finding does not 
hold for Britain in the 1990s (Addison and Belfield, 2004) but negative employment 
growth effects are more pronounced where bargaining coverage is high (Bryson, 
2004). 
 
                                                 
1 DiNardo and Lee (2004) find no effect of unionisation on employment in the United States. However, 
as the authors readily admit (pp. 1428-1430), their estimates differ in important respects from the other 
studies.  First, they estimate the effect of new unionisation, that is, effects shortly after an NLRB 
election. Second, their regression discontinuity methodology recovers the effect at the margin between 
workplaces where votes were just won and those where they were just lost. 
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The standard assumption is that unions and employers bargain over wages whereas 
employers set employment levels unilaterally conditional on the wage. If maximising 
profits, they will choose an employment level that lies along the labour demand curve. 
Yet, in many instances, unions in Britain do bargain over employment levels as well 
as wages (Bryson, 2004: 481).  In these circumstances, efficient wage bargaining 
suggests that employment outcomes will be a function of the relative bargaining 
power of unions and employers and the utility maximisation of both parties.  
Although there is no direct evidence for Britain on the weight unions attach to 
employment compared to wages, Bryson (2004: 494-495) finds that when bargaining 
over employment and wages occurs the union effect on employment growth is 
ameliorated. 
  
Studies for Britain also indicate that unionised workplaces have lower dismissal rates 
than non-unionised workplaces (Cully et al., 1999: 128) and lower voluntary quit rates 
(Fernie and Metcalf, 1995), findings consistent with evidence that unionised 
workplaces have lower job turnover and longer average job tenure.  Yet little is 
known about the effects of unionisation on within-workplace job cuts. Some recent 
studies suggest that unions are often involved in ‘managing’ job cuts. For instance, 
Bryson, Capellari and Lucifora (2004) show unionised workplaces are more likely to 
have job security guarantees (JSGs) than non-unionised workplaces, but that JSG 
workplaces are just as likely to suffer job loss as those without a JSG.  The difference 
appears to be that JSG workplaces were less likely to resort to compulsory 
redundancies.  The authors suggest that this is the reason why employee perceptions 
of job security were higher in workplaces with JSGs than those without. This finding 
is supportive of case-study research by Kelly (2004: 281) who concludes “that the 
main function of ‘job security’ agreements is to help companies jointly manage labor 
force reductions rather than avoid them”.   White (2005) also finds union recognition 
was associated with a combination of higher levels of labour cost-cutting in the form 
of workforce contraction and outsourcing, and better fringe benefits and family-
friendly practices than non-unionised workplaces.  He interprets this as evidence of 
mutual gains, whereby unionised workers trade labour flexibility for higher benefits. 
 
Most of these studies focus on the private sector.  However, Addison and Belfield 
(2004) find negative employment growth effects of union recognition in the public 
sector similar to those for the private sector.  In addition, they find evidence for the 
public sector that changes in workplace-level union recognition affect employment 
growth, with new recognitions reducing employment growth and union de-recognition 
increasing employment growth (Addison and Belfield, 2004).  These union switches 
do not affect employment growth in the private sector. 
 
 
3.  Theoretical Discussion 
 
The reason most commonly advanced for supposing that the presence of unions 
reduces workplace employment is if they raise wages.  Admittedly a negative effect 
on employment does not follow according to some theories of wage-fixing and 
production (e.g., McDonald and Solow, 1981).  None the less, as already indicated, 
most empirical inquiries have been consistent with the traditional, simple view of the 
relationship, and that view is maintained here.   
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This section consequently has two main tasks.  The first is to consider whether, given 
a negative relationship between union presence and workplace employment, that can 
also be extended to WWJCs.  The second is to consider whether, or how, union 
presence may be related to JSGs.  In addressing these tasks, consideration is also 
given to differences between the public and market sectors. 
 
WWJCs and unions 
 
For the market sector, the employer’s employment decision on a specific section of 
the workplace will (other things being equal) be shifted toward cuts by any mark-up 
on wages or benefits achieved by unions for that section.  That however depends on 
whether the section itself has union representation.2  So, one can infer that WWJCs 
become more probable (for any one or more sections) as union representation across 
sections becomes more extensive.   
 
Two widely used measures of unionisation that predict union representation of 
sections of the workforce are workplace membership density, and multi-unionism.  As 
union density approaches 100 per cent, it becomes highly probable that all sections 
are covered.3  The presence of more than one union also empirically predicts 
increased sectional representation.  For example, in the dataset used for the present 
research, the correlation between number of occupational groups at a workplace in the 
market sector and number of groups having union representation was 0.31 when there 
was only one union, but 0.56 with two or more unions.  For the public sector, the 
corresponding correlations were 0.54 and 0.80.4  In addition, it has been argued (e.g., 
Horn and Wolinksy, 1988) that when a union represents only a section of the 
workforce, it tends to ignore its bargaining externalities on other employees; and this 
is accentuated if unions bargain separately rather than jointly.  It therefore attempts to 
push for a higher wage than a union with wide representation that has to take account 
of possible repercussions for employment across groups.  To the extent this takes 
place, multi-unionism will increase the employer’s probability of resorting to 
WWJCs. 
 
These considerations do not apply in the same way to the public sector.  Apart from 
the absence of a financial maximand, pay and benefits are rarely decided at workplace 
level in the public sector, so there is usually little scope for unions to exert workplace 
pressure through local wage bargaining.5  Accordingly, there is no reason to 
hypothesise that workplace unionisation affects WWJCs in the public sector, so the 
relationship between union density or multi-unionism should be weaker than in the 
market sector.  Local public sector unions will however strive to get the best 
severance terms for their members (as in the market sector), and management will 
                                                 
2  While some positive ‘spillover’ effects from union bargaining may be gained by a non-union section, 
this is likely to be smaller than the effect gained by a unionised section.   
3  Even in this case, particular sections – notably management – may be excluded from bargaining. 
4  Although one could use the proportion of occupational groups with union representation as the 
unionisation variable, standard occupational groups often do not correspond to the sections recognised 
within a workplace.  Also, such a measure is less smooth by comparison with union density and yields 
no objective classification like multi-unionism. 
5  The dataset used in the present research shows that in 1998, 42 per cent of market sector workplaces 
had their pay decisions made at workplace level while this applied to six per cent of public sector 
workplaces.  The pay fixing referred to did not necessarily take place through collective bargaining; in 
fact, the proportions varied little between unionised and non-union workplaces. 
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also need to involve unions as agents in implementing WWJCs in an effective 
manner.  This leads on to the issue of agreements to refrain from compulsory 
severance or more generally to offer job security guarantees (JSGs). 
 
JSGs and unions 
 
Bryson, Capellari and Lucifora (2004) suggest that employers offer job security 
guarantees because they wish to dispense with some posts but retain others (our 
emphasis).  The implication is that JSGs help to prevent or reduce turnover in the 
posts that employers desire to retain.  This suggestion can be developed into a model 
of JSGs, under reasonable behavioural assumptions.  These are that (i) WWJCs 
(whether actual or potential) increase feelings of insecurity among employees of other 
job groups, (ii) Feelings of insecurity increase quits, and (iii)  JSGs reduce feelings of 
insecurity.   
 
Consider an employer with two job-groups labelled ‘1’ and ‘2’, and considering job 
cuts in 1 only.  Through WWJCs the employer computes that the profit contribution 
of 1 will increase by Y, after taking account of severance costs, but also believes that 
there will be costs of increased quits in 2, labelled C2.  Now assume that any JSG will 
apply to both groups (the usual arrangement).  The JSG introduces an increase in the 
severance cost for 1, C1, because the agreement is more constraining than standard 
severance terms; but it will reduce C2 by a factor 1/d (d≥1), where d represents the 
‘dependability’ of the guarantee ; as d increases, the JSG becomes more effective in 
reassuring  employees and eliminating the induced turnover costs.  The employer goes 
ahead with cuts, but without JSG, if Y-C2>0 and C2<C1+C2/d, and it uses both cuts 
and JSG if  Y-C1-C2/d>0 and C1+C2/d<C2.  In short, JSGs will tend to be offered 
where the severance costs for group 1 are not greatly increased, and where the 
guarantee can be effectively communicated to group 2, so as to reduce unwanted 
turnover.   
 
Unions, if present, come into the picture in two ways: through a bargaining role on 
behalf of group 1, which affects C1, and through their voice role, which affects group 
2 and factor d.6  If a union is present for 1, C1 is smaller under JSG: because of 
bargaining, more favourable severance terms for employees have already been taken 
account of in Y (see previous paragraph), so there is less that JSG can do to enhance 
these terms for group 1.  In group 2, the presence of a union reassures employees 
about the dependability of the employer’s JSG, whereas in the absence of a union, the 
employees are more inclined to disbelieve the promise.  The union can also ensure 
that the JSG is correctly framed by management to meet employees’ anxieties.  Thus, 
other things equal, unwanted labour turnover will be reduced more by JSGs where 
group 2 is unionised than where it is non-union, since factor d is increased through 
union voice services (Freeman and Medoff, 1984).7  
 
                                                 
6 Bargaining on severance does not arise for group 2, because the employer does not wish to cut jobs 
there. Voice-induced belief does not matter in 1, because induced turnover has already been taken 
account of by management in the WWJC decision. 
7  Another case where JSGs can play a part is when WWJCs are potential rather than actual, but 
insecurity is rising because of employees’ foresight.  Here management has to set the immediate 
reduction in turnover costs, from an effective JSG, against the possible future increases in severance 
costs. The same reasoning about the role of unions applies in this case. 
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Accordingly, the situation where both groups are unionised tends to be the most 
favourable for JSGs, since the additional severance costs are lower and the cost of 
unwanted quits is also likely to be reduced.  A situation with one unionised group 
provides one of these advantages while the least favourable situation is where neither 
is unionised.  Management decisions will however depend on the specific relativities 
between severance costs and labour turnover costs, as well as these general 
considerations.  Also, some workplaces may self-select into non-unionism through a 
harmonious or trusting long-term relationship between management and employees, 
which can be maintained under some circumstances by JSGs.  This helps to explain 
the fact that JSGs occur in some non-union workplaces. 
 
This model can produce predictions about the role of unions for JSGs in a similar way 
as for WWJCs.  JSGs are more likely to be offered by employers where unions cover 
several sections of employees, and this in turn becomes more likely as union density 
increases or if multi-unionism is present.  Also, where multi-unionism is present, 
unions specialise in voice services relating to particular sections of employees, and we 
hypothesise that this will tend to be more effective, further increasing the probability 
of JSGs being offered. 
 
Unlike with WWJCs, this simple model for JSGs appears suitable for the public sector 
as well as the market sector, once job cuts (actual or potential) are given, since union 
voice services will play the same role in both sectors.  Further, public sector 
employers have good reason to be particularly averse to unwanted turnover: cost per 
quit and per replacement is high, as a result of greater training provision than in the 
market sector and more bureaucratised recruitment procedures. 
 
The role of other theoretically relevant variables 
 
The inclusion of the public sector in this research motivates the use of two variables, 
which have not previously been used in studies of unions and workplace employment.  
These, it is hoped, help to clarify differences in employment practices between the 
sectors. 
 
It has been customary to assume that monopoly producers are more able than other 
firms to pass on increases in labour costs in higher prices.  This suggests that 
monopoly producers are less likely to resort to WWJCs.  In recent years, however, 
increased financial incentives have been provided for senior management in many 
companies, tied to financial performance measures; financial markets have also, it is 
claimed, become enthusiastic over signals of labour cost reduction.  These 
developments will have reduced any supposed tendency for monopoly employers in 
the market sector to ‘feather-bed’ their employees.  Most monopoly services, 
however, are in the public sector, where financial incentives and financial disciplines 
are less developed.  From 1979, British governments have persistently attempted to 
open public services to competition, but this still covers only a minority of services.  
A monopoly position may therefore have different effects on employment practices 
across sectors. 
 
Another respect in which the sectors are likely to differ is in the relative position of 
women employees.  It is hypothesised that employers’ use of WWJCs and JSGs will 
be affected by the proportions of women employed at the workplace, but that this will 
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depend also upon sector.  Labour costs will be lower where the female employment 
proportion is high, largely because of gender wage discrimination and associated 
costs.  This labour cost advantage will however be smaller in the public sector since it 
is more constrained by an ethos of compliance with equal opportunity.   
 
 
4.  Data and Variables 
 
The dataset used in the following analysis is the Workplace Employee Relations 
Survey of 1998 (WER98).  The level of observation is the workplace.  WERS98 was 
a sample survey of workplaces (that is, places of employment at a single address or 
site) with 10 or more employees, across all regions of Britain and all industries except 
agriculture, fishing, mining and quarrying, private households, and extra-territorial 
organizations.  This was the fourth survey in a series beginning in 1980, which is 
regarded as the prime source of information about workplace employment and 
industrial relations practices in Britain.  In 1998, 2191 interviews were completed 
with a management respondent at each workplace; the response rate was 83 per cent.  
These were the members of management with responsibility for employee relations 
policies at the workplace.  Further details of WERS98 are provided in Cully et al. 
(1999).  
 
A particular advantage of taking 1998 as the focal year is that it came toward the end 
of a period of considerable employee anxiety about job security (Heery and Salmon, 
1999) and of declining unionism, and also at the end of an era of Conservative 
government that placed emphasis upon reducing the size of the public sector.     
 
Variables 
 
The summary statistics for all variables used in the analyses are shown in Table 1.  
The table is divided into four panels, following the order of discussion below. 
 
(i) The dependent variables 
 
WWJCs are represented by a binary variable scored 1 if there have been reductions in 
any section of the workplace during the past year.  Respondents who said such 
reductions had occurred were also asked what form these reductions had taken: 
wastage, labour redeployment, voluntary redundancies or early retirements, or 
compulsory redundancies.  Nearly all workplaces with WWJCs recorded at least one 
of the labour reduction methods, and in the majority of cases more than one.  
 
JSGs are represented by a binary variable scored 1 if the workplace has made a 
guarantee of job security, or of no compulsory redundancy, to the largest occupational 
group at the workplace. Only 12 per cent of workplaces with any JSGs did not include 
the largest occupational group, and in 76 per cent of cases of JSGs for the largest 
occupational group, all occupational groups at the workplace were covered by the 
guarantee.  The variable therefore represents a widespread policy within the 
workplace. 
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(ii)  Union variables 
 
Following on from the earlier discussion, the analysis uses two measures of 
unionisation.  Union membership density at workplaces with union recognition has six 
categories, as follows: no union recognised; 1-29% membership; 30-49%; 50-69%; 
70-89%; 90-100%.8  Union membership is ignored when there is no recognition.   
Single and multi-unionism is represented by a variable with four categories: no union 
recognised; single union; two or more unions, bargaining jointly; two or more unions, 
bargaining separately. The distinction between separate and joint bargaining may be 
important in relation to the point about bargaining externalities made in section 3 (see 
Horn and Wolinsky, 1988).  
 
The two variables are used in separate model specifications, rather than jointly, 
because they are closely associated.  This is especially the case in the market sector, 
because of the presence of a high level of non-unionism common to both variables. 
 
As noted earlier, ‘no union’ is a weak category in the public sector.  Accordingly, the 
main interest lies in comparisons between the unionised categories in each sector, so 
for union membership density, the 1-29% category is taken as the reference group, 
and for multi-unionism, single union is the reference group.  In the market sector, 
comparisons between the non-union case and the varied unionised cases are also of 
interest.  
 
(iii)  Other explanatory variables 
 
Representing the concept of monopoly position, a dummy variable is defined in a 
partially different way for the market and public sectors.  In the market sector, it is 
scored 1 if management does not consider that ‘change in market conditions or 
competitive situation’ has been an ‘important factor’ in bringing about changes that it 
has experienced in the past five years;9 and if, additionally, the company’s UK market 
share for its (main) product or service exceeds 50 per cent.  In the public sector, only 
the first condition (experience of market pressures or competition) is taken into 
account, as the market share question was not asked at public sector workplaces.  It is 
assumed that if a public sector workplace does not experience competition, it has a 
monopoly share of the service it provides.  On this criterion, market sector workplaces 
representing eight per cent of employment had a monopoly position in 1998 whereas 
the corresponding proportion in the public sector was 69 per cent.  It is of interest that 
nearly one third of public sector employees were in workplaces that regarded 
themselves as being affected by market conditions or competition.   
 
The percentage of women employees at the workplace is a continuous variable.  As 
well as having an explanatory role, this variable serves as a control since it is 
negatively associated with unionisation variables in the market sector. 
                                                 
8  Ideally we would have liked to classify 100% membership separately, because of the historical 
importance in Britain of ‘closed shop’ arrangements, but there were only 48 such cases. 
9  A workplace was also assumed to be unaffected by competition if it reported no significant change in 
its circumstances for the past five years, but this applied to only four per cent of workplaces. 
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(iv)  Control variables 
 
The characteristics known from previous research to be important for union 
recognition, in Britain, are sector, size, industry, region and age of workplace.  
Variables representing all these characteristics are included.  For all analyses, the 
market and public sectors are treated separately, permitting parameter estimates for all 
other variables to take different values by sector. Size is represented by the log of the 
number of employees at the workplace one year previously.  The use of lagged size 
rather than current size means we avoid confounding our dependent variable, WWJC 
in the last 12 months, with our right-hand side variable capturing size as a structural 
feature of the workplace. Region is represented by 11 dummies, and age of workplace 
is grouped into four bands that reflect the main distinctions relevant to unionisation 
found in previous studies.  There are 12 industry groups, overall, but these are 
reduced to 11 for the market sector models and to nine for the public sector models, 
because of insufficient numbers in some cells. 
 
A further variable included for both sectors indicates whether the workplace is a 
separate, administrative head office of an organisation.  Such locations may be treated 
differently in corporate employment policy, compared to operational units, and may 
also have different forms of unionisation.   For the market sector only, a final control 
variable combines information about corporate status (plc or non-plc) and ownership 
(UK or non-UK). 
 
 
5.  Analysis Method 
 
The focus of the analysis is on the effects of unionisation on two outcomes, the 
occurrence of WWJCs and the occurrence of JSGs, which can be regarded as 
employers’ policy choices.  To identify the union effects, we assume that selection 
into unionisation is independent of these outcomes, conditional on the control 
variables (Manski, 1995: 37-43).  This assumption rests on prior knowledge that 
union recognition in Britain is strongly influenced by structural characteristics that 
have been included in the regressors (see previous section). There may also be 
unobserved factors affecting employers’ decisions concerning union recognition in 
particular cases, but these factors can be presumed to apply chiefly in the early years 
of a workplace, since once a workplace’s union status has been established, it is rarely 
reviewed (Willman, Bryson and Gomez, 2006).  Given the low rate of change in 
union recognition which began to prevail at the end of the 1990s (Gall, 2004), one can 
reasonably treat unobservables as ignorable.  Furthermore, issues of self-selection into 
unionisation are scarcely relevant in the public sector where a presumption of 
unionisation has long prevailed (Millward et al., 2000). 
 
The WWJC and JSG decisions can be thought of as discrete choices generated by 
values of underlying continuous distributions (see section 2).  Analysis by means of 
the probit model is customary for this type of problem. With two dependent variables 
of interest, however, the initial issue is whether to perform a joint analysis or separate 
analyses. If WWJCs and JSGs represent a joint decision process, separate estimation 
of WWJC and JSG will not be consistent because of the likely presence of common 
unobserved variables. According to one view, a JSG-type agreement would be 
instituted by management as an adjunct to WWJCs to reduce the costs of induced 
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labour turnover, and this would point towards joint analysis.  It was also noted in 
section 3, however, that JSGs could be set up without WWJCs being present, because 
employees can react adversely to potential as well as to actual job cuts.  Employers 
can also set up JSGs to allay fears of compulsory redundancy at times of 
reorganisation or technical change, even if no redundancies are planned (see Bryson, 
Capellari and Lucifora, 2004 and Kelly, 2004).  Because of such variations in practice 
JSGs would often be observed in the absence of WWJCs.  Accordingly joint 
determination of WWJCs and JSGs is an empirical issue.  This section first presents 
tests relating to this issue. The analysis which is developed in the light of the results 
of the test, is then presented in more detail. 
 
Initially, a set of bivariate probit models was estimated under the assumption of the 
errors having a joint normal distribution (see Greene, 2003, and Appendix for the 
model specification).  The bivariate probit model estimates one additional parameter 
representing the correlation between errors, relative to estimating two separate 
probits.  The functional form assumptions identify the model when the same 
regressors are used for each dependent variable; no exclusion restriction is required. 
Wald test statistics for the null hypothesis that the correlation is equal to zero are 
shown, for a set of four models, in Table 2. These results offered no evidence that 
WWJCs and JSGs are jointly affected by unobserved variables.  The correlations are 
all close to zero and the Wald test is always non-significant at the 15 per cent level.   
 
The analysis accordingly proceeds by means of separate probit models for the two 
dependent variables.  Four variant models are computed for each: two sectors by two 
unionisation variables (union density, and multi-unionism).  After excluding cases 
with missing data, there are 1920 cases for analysis: 1357 in the market sector and 
563 in the public sector.  The data are analysed in weighted form, such that they are 
representative of aggregate employment in workplaces with 10 or more employees.  
The general value of a weighted analysis with sample data is in minimising sampling 
bias.  A technical advantage of employment weighting in the present case is that it 
results in a considerably smaller variance in the weighting variable, by comparison 
with weighting to establishment numbers.  This is because WERS98, in common with 
most surveys of employers, has a stratified sampling plan with selection probabilities 
that are already quasi-proportional to size of workplace (larger workplaces are 
oversampled while smaller workplaces are undersampled).10  Some econometric 
analyses of WERS data, including Blanchflower, Millward and Oswald (1991) and 
Booth and McCulloch (1999) have been unweighted: this in effect accepts the quasi-
employment weighting which is inbuilt to the sampling design.  The weighting 
applied here takes this a step further, in correcting the sample for departures from 
proportional-to-size sampling, whether in the design itself or arising from re-
classification and non-response (see Cully et al., 1999 for these technical details).  We 
also regard employment weighting as more relevant for policy interpretation and for 
assessing repercussions on employees, since more weight is given to relationships in 
the data that affect larger numbers of people.  Standard errors for all estimates are 
derived with a robust variance estimator to take account of heteroskedasticity and of 
weighting. 
                                                 
10  The sampling fractions ranged from 1 in 545 in workplaces with 10-24 employees to 1 in 21 for 
workplaces with 500 or more employees: Cully et al. (1999: 304).  However, other factors affecting 
sampling increase the variation of sample weights considerably beyond the range implied by these 
figures. 
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6.  Results  
 
This section presents the modelled results for WWJCs before turning to JSGs.  To set 
the scene for the analyses, it may be helpful first to consider the descriptives for the 
two dependent variables and to note an aspect of their relationship that will be 
important for subsequent interpretation. 
 
Over the 1997-8 period, Table 1 shows that workplaces accounting for 34 per cent of 
employment within the market sector experienced WWJCs.  In the public sector, the 
corresponding figure was 45 per cent.  These figures illustrate a period when public 
sector financial stringency, established under the ‘Thatcher regime’, was still in force.  
Over the same period, Table 1 shows that workplaces accounting for seven per cent of 
employment within the market sector experienced JSGs.  In the public sector, the 
corresponding figure was 24 per cent.  So the public sector in this period had a 
somewhat higher incidence of WWJCs than the market sector, and it had a very much 
higher incidence of JSGs. 
 
WWJCs occur widely without JSGs and vice versa.  None the less, there would be no 
value in JSGs unless they were seen to affect employer behaviour.  In fact, evidence 
from WERS98 indicates that employers with JSGs are highly constrained by them. As 
shown in Table 3, employers in the market sector with JSGs rarely applied 
compulsory redundancies as a method of making WWJCs.  In the public sector, they 
never did so.  When no JSGs were in place, compulsory redundancies were used 
frequently. 
 
(a) The effects of unionisation variables on  WWJCs 
 
The effects of the unionisation variables are summarised in the upper two panels of 
Table 4.  The results for the market sector will be considered first.  Compared to the 
lowest union density of 1-29 per cent membership, higher union densities were linked 
to an increased relative odds of WWJC, but the effect was not monotonic.  The effect 
became positive, at just below the five per cent significance level at a density of 50-69 
per cent, declined and became non-significant for densities of 70-89 per cent 
membership, and then increased to a much larger and more significant effect for the 
highest category of density (90-100 per cent).  The corresponding marginal effects 
(changes in probabilities, evaluated at the means of the other variables) are shown in 
the second and third columns of Table 6.  For the 50-69 per cent membership 
category, the probability of WWJCs taking place was increased by 14.3 percentage 
points relative to 1-29 per cent membership or by 10.1 percentage points relative to 
30-49 per cent membership. For the 90-100 per cent membership category the 
marginal effects were 33.9 percentage points relative to 1-29 per cent membership 
and 24.0 percentage points relative to 70-89 per cent membership.  These membership 
density groups with significant effects on WWJCs contained seven per cent and three 
per cent of market sector employment, respectively.  In the market sector, then, the 
main contrast is between the strongest level of unionism and any other situation, 
whether moderately unionised or non-unionised: but the strongest group represents 
only a very small proportion of workplace employment.  So, if one relied solely on 
the density variable, one would conclude that the practical importance of local 
unionisation on WWJCs was minor.  Similarly, Addison and Belfield (2004) found no 
effect of union density on workplace-level employment growth. 
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A stronger conclusion, however, emerges from the market sector models using the 
multi-unionism variable.  Multi-unionism, whether with joint or separate bargaining, 
had positive and significant effects on WWJCs relative to the single-union situation; 
the coefficient for separate bargaining was greater than for joint bargaining, but not 
significantly so.  The marginal effects relative to single unionism (Table 6) were an 
increase in the probability of WWJCs by 13.1 percentage points for joint bargaining 
and 19.3 percentage points for separate bargaining.  As the multi-union situations 
covered 16 per cent of employment in the market sector, these estimated effects have 
substantial practical significance.   
 
The results for the public sector showed, as hypothesised, much weaker or non-
existent effects of unionisation on WWJCs. Effects of increasing union density, 
though always positively signed, were not significant in the public sector even at the 
15 per cent significance level.  It is true that unionised public sector workplaces as a 
whole had higher odds of WWJCs than non-union workplaces, but this has to be 
interpreted with caution because, as noted earlier, the non-union workplaces are few 
and, being highly concentrated in education, cannot sensibly be contrasted with the 
great majority of unionised workplaces.  A somewhat similar pattern of positive but 
non-significant results was found when using the multi-union versus single union 
contrasts. 
 
Overall, there is reasonably consistent evidence of union density having a positive 
effect on WWJCs in the market sector.  This is consistent with the previous evidence 
concerning unions and overall employment change at workplace level, and can be 
interpreted in a similar way.  However, from a practical viewpoint the more important 
factor appears to be multi-unionism.  A possible interpretation is that under multi-
unionism the unions tend to press more strongly on wages and have less regard to 
employment repercussions.  The lack of significant unionisation effects on WWJCs in 
the public sector is consistent with the argument that the prevalence there of higher-
level wage fixing removes the scope of local unions to create wage pressures.  
 
(b) The results of other theoretically interesting variables on WWJCs 
 
The lowest panel of Table 4 displays the estimates for the variables that play a 
supporting explanatory role in these analyses.  In the market sector, the female 
employment variable was negatively signed, and the estimates were significant in the 
two specifications at the 10 per cent significance level.  For the public sector, 
estimates hovered around zero and were not significant.  This appears consistent with 
the argument that lower female wages reduce wage pressures, and hence the 
occurrence of WWJCs, in the market sector, but less so in the public sector possibly 
because of equal opportunity policies.    
 
Turning to the monopoly position variable, estimates for both sectors are negatively 
signed.  However in neither model, are they significant at the 15 per cent level for the 
market sector and in both models they are significant at the 5 per cent level for the 
public sector.  An interpretation is that in the market sector, financial incentives and 
disciplines have eliminated much of any difference between a monopoly market 
position and a competitive market position, from the viewpoint of avoiding WWJCs.  
In the public sector, there remains a difference between the monopoly service 
providers (the majority) and those that are more exposed to market influences (the 
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minority).  Increased market exposure is associated, as would be expected, with a 
higher probability of WWJCs. 
 
Overall, the ancillary variables suggest differences in the character of WWJCs across 
the two sectors.  The market sector is responsive at local level to wage pressures or 
wage costs, but not to a monopoly position.  The public sector workplaces are 
unresponsive at local level to wage pressures and costs, probably because these are 
determined by agreements and policies established elsewhere, but become more likely 
to make job cuts when exposed to market competition. 
 
(c)  The effects of unionisation variables on JSGs 
 
The effects of the unionisation variables on the probability of JSGs are shown, across 
the various model specifications, in the upper panel of Table 5, while the marginal 
effects are summarised in the fourth and fifth columns of Table 6. 
 
The probability of having a JSG in the market sector rose progressively and steeply 
with increasing union density, relative to the lowest level of density.  Non-union 
workplaces also had an increased probability of JSGs than the lowest unionised level, 
but this difference was not large.  A practical difference relating to JSGs became 
apparent once unions represented at least one half of employees.  Compared with the 
lowest-density unionised workplaces, those with 70-89 per cent union membership 
had a 10 percentage point increase in the probability of JSGs and those with 90-100 
per cent density had nearly a 20 percentage point increase.   
 
For the market sector, the alternative model specification showed multi-union 
situations positively affecting JSGs, relative to either single union or non-union 
situations.  However, the effect was significant only for workplaces with joint 
bargaining arrangements, for which the marginal probability of JSGs being provided 
increased by 7.6 percentage points, compared with single union workplaces. 
 
In the public sector, in sharp contrast with the market sector, there were no significant 
effects of union density on JSGs.  However, as in the market sector, here multi-
unionism accompanied by joint bargaining arrangements increased the probability of 
JSGs, with a marginal effect of 18.9 percentage points relative to the single union 
situation.  Although this is considerably larger than the corresponding marginal effect 
in the market sector, it should be recalled that JSGs are far more common in the 
public sector.  The multiplicative effects on relative odds are similar across sectors. 
 
The results concerning multi-unionism, when compared across sectors, provide some 
evidence in support of the earlier argument that JSGs would be promoted by 
widespread unionism in both sectors.  There is however an obvious difficulty in the 
different between-sector results concerning union density.  One way out of this 
difficulty is if one interprets multi-unionism, in this context, as primarily reflecting 
unions’ voice services (i.e., unions have more effective voice services when they 
specialise by type of employee), while union density has its customary interpretation 
in terms of (local) bargaining power.  The suggestion is that in the market sector, 
unions can influence severance terms locally both through bargaining power and 
through voice.  Public sector unions cannot influence severance terms locally through 
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bargaining power (this may result from a lack of local bargaining structures), but can 
exert an influence through local voice. 
 
(d) The results of other theoretically interesting variables on JSGs 
 
The lowest panel of Table 5 displays the estimates for the variables that play a 
supporting explanatory role in the analyses of JSGs.  In the market sector, the 
proportion of women in the workforce exerted a positive and significant effect on 
JSGs.  This is reasonable if women employees reduce the added severance costs of 
JSGs (because these depend in part on wages, and in part on the normal rate of 
voluntary quits), making JSGs more affordable.  Indeed, the results here could be 
taken as further evidence of market sector employers’ sensitivity to severance costs.  
A monopoly position did not affect the use of JSGs in the market sector. 
 
The public sector’s use of JSGs, like that of the market sector, was unaffected by a 
monopoly position.  However, when a higher proportion of women employees was 
present, the probability of JSGs being provided was reduced in the public sector.  This 
is an unexpected finding for which we can offer no interpretation.   
 
 
7.  Discussion and Conclusions 
 
This paper fills a gap in the existing literature by focusing on one possible reason for 
the well-documented association between lower employment growth rates and 
unionisation, namely the increased propensity for employers to cut jobs where unions 
operate at workplace-level.   We conjectured that union effects on within-workplace 
job cuts (WWJCs) would be more evident where unions had the bargaining power to 
maintain above-market level wages and benefits, and where they covered some 
sections of the workforce but not others, the rationale for the latter being a lack of 
union concern for the employment effects that their wage claims might have for 
uncovered workers in the workplace.  However, we also argued that unions remain 
concerned with the employment consequences of their bargaining, motivating them to 
bargain for job security guarantees (JSGs) for their members.  We further argued that 
employers have an interest in offering these guarantees where they wish to make 
WWJCs, since JSGs can reduce quits from among core workers who they wish to 
maintain but whose feelings of job insecurity might otherwise rise when they see 
fellow workers’ jobs cut.  We outlined a model under which employers might engage 
in job cuts either with or without a JSG, showing that the probability of using a JSG 
rises with the number of employee groups covered by a union.  Union bargaining 
plays a role in reducing the additional costs of JSG coverage to those groups who are 
targeted for cuts, while union voice can enhance employees’ perceptions of JSG 
credibility, thus reducing quit rates among the group of workers employers wish to 
maintain.  We also argued that these effects were likely to be more muted in the 
public sector. 
 
As hypothesised, both union density at the workplace and multi-unionism had positive 
significant effects on WWJCs in the market sector and neither had significant effects 
on WWJCs in the public sector.  However, the market-sector effects of density were 
weak, while the effects of multi-unionism were clearer and affected a larger section of 
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the workforce. The effects in the public sector, though non-significant, were always 
positive.  
 
The hypothesis with respect to JSGs was that the unionisation variables would have 
positive and significant effects for both sectors. This proved to be the case in the 
market sector, but in the public sector only multi-unionism had the predicted effect. 
This pattern of findings is consistent with multi-unionism being interpreted in terms 
of ‘voice’ and union density in terms of ‘bargaining power’, a conjecture that could 
usefully be explored in future research.  
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Appendix:  Bivariate Probit Models 
 
The bivariate probit model is an extension of the usual single-equation probit model 
to the situation where there are two binary dependent variables with correlated 
disturbances, and complete data on all observations (to distinguish this from the 
bivariate probit selection model).  For dependent variables Y1 and Y2 and 
observations i (i=1, … , n), one has four marginal probabilities, Pr(Y1i=0 & Y2i=0), 
Pr(Y1i=1 & Y2i=0), Pr(Y1i=0 & Y2i=1) and Pr(Y1i=1 & Y2i=1).  
 
The bivariate probit model extends the probit model to this situation as follows: 
 
y*1=β'1x1 + ε1, y1 =1 if y*1>0, y1=0 otherwise 
 
y*2=β'2x2 + ε2, y2 =1 if y*2>0, y2=0 otherwise 
 
where 
 
E(ε1)=E(ε2)=0 
 
Var(ε1)=Var(ε2)=1 
 
Cov(ε1, ε2)=ρ 
 
To write the log-likelihood, put qi1=2yi1-1, qi2=2yi2-1, and wij=qij β'jxij,  ρi*= qi1 qi2ρ 
for j=1,2.  Then 
 
log L = Σ ln Φ(wi1, wi2, ρi*) 
 
where summation is over the n observations and Φ is the bivariate normal cdf (see 
Greene, 2003: 849-51 for further details of estimation by maximum likelihood). 
 
When ρ=0, the log-likelihood from the above model equals the sum of the log 
likelihoods from two separately estimated probit models for y*1 and y*2.  This leads to 
the application of standard hypothesis tests (LR or LM, or Wald test in the case of 
robust estimation) for the correlation term. 
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Table 1   Descriptive statistics 
 
                                 market sector  public sector 
                                 N=1357   N=563 
                              Mean      s.e.       Mean     s.e. 
dependent variables 
within-workplace job reduction  .3408     .0160      .4481    .0270 
job security guarantee          .0698     .0080      .2411    .0222 
explanatory variables (unions) 
no union                        .6497     .0161      .0837    .0138 
density 1-29%                   .1008     .0104      .1204    .0165 
density 30-49%                  .0646     .0080      .2091    .0254 
density 50-69%                  .0660     .0079      .2366    .0222 
density 70-89%                  .0894     .0098      .1942    .0206 
density 90-100%                 .0295     .0050      .1559    .0175 
single union                    .1945     .0128      .2760    .0237 
2+ unions, joint bargaining     .0895     .0100      .4115    .0270 
2+ unions, separate bargaining  .0664     .0086      .2289    .0215 
explanatory variables (supplementary) 
women employees % of total    44.0629     .9811    62.3984   1.4296 
monopoly position               .0782     .0100      .6887    .0250 
control variables 
log employees 1 year ago       4.5290     .0574     5.1826    .1095 
head office                     .1065     .0108      .0709    .0133 
plc uk-owned                    .4311     .0171 
non-plc uk-owned                .4058     .0165 
plc foreign-owned               .0889     .0106 
non-plc foreign-owned           .0743     .0091 
east anglia                     .0467     .0069      .0346    .0090  
east midlands                   .0780     .0087      .0750    .0138 
london                          .1128     .0102      .1414    .0177 
north                           .0596     .0080      .0689    .0164 
north west                      .1065     .0103      .1184    .0185 
scotland                        .0792     .0091      .1267    .0187 
rest of south east              .2049     .0140      .1611    .0181 
south west                      .0865     .0098      .0623    .0116 
wales                           .0422     .0065      .0552    .0138 
west midlands                   .0956     .0109      .0821    .0139 
yorkshire & humberside          .0881     .0107      .0743    .0144 
workplace age <5 years          .1720     .0130      .1322    .0198 
workplace age 5-9 years         .2044     .0145      .0753    .0125 
workplace age 10-24 years       .2928     .0152      .2450    .0232 
workplace age 25+ years         .3308     .0161      .6887    .0250 
manufacturing                   .2894     .0166 
utilities                       .0081     .0012 
mfg. & utilities           .0061    .0029 
construction                    .0425     .0065      .0263    .0059 
distribution                    .2143     .0140 
hotels & catering               .0628     .0074 
transport & communication       .0632     .0081 
distn.,h.& c., & trans.& comm.        .0714    .0148 
financial services              .0554     .0071       
other business services         .1568     .0126      .0377    .0114 
public administrationa          .2399    .0212 
education                       .0193     .0037      .2813    .0227 
health                          .0619     .0076      .2942    .0273 
other services                  .0264     .0039      .0429    .0078 
 
Note:  One market sector workplace coded as ‘public administration’ has been 
reclassified to ‘business services’ in the present analysis. 
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Table 2:  Tests of the bivariate probit model relative to separate probit models 
for WWJCs and JSGs 
 
 Market sector sample N=1357 Public sector sample N=563 
 athrho Wald for 
rho=0 
p for 
Wald 
athrho Wald for 
rho=0 
p for 
Wald 
Models with TU 
density 
0.08 1.07 0.30 -0.07 0.55 0.46 
Models with multi-
unionism 
0.09 1.38 0.24 -0.08 0.71 0.40 
 
Notes:  All models are estimated under employment weighting, with a robust variance 
estimator.  For variables included in models, see Tables 4 and 5.  The Wald test 
computes a chi-square statistic on one degree of freedom. 
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Table 3:  Compulsory redundancy in workplaces with WWJCs, by presence of 
JSG 
 
 job security guarantee present?  
compulsory 
redundancy used? 
no yes total 
                     Market sector  
66.1% 91.1% 67.9% no 
n=257 n=63 n=320 
33.9%  8.9% 32.1% yes 
n=191 n=4 n=195 
100% 100% 100% all 
n=448 n=67 n=515 
                       Public sector  
no 82.0% 100.0% 86.9% 
 n=126 n=58 n=184 
yes 18.0%  0.0% 13.1% 
 n=61 n=0 n=61 
all 100% 100% 100% 
 n=187 n=58 n=245 
 
Notes:  Table restricted to those cases from the main analysis where WWJCs took 
place.  Ns are observations, percentages are employment weighted. 
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Table 4:  Effects on WWJCs of unionisation and other explanatory variables 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
density (ref. 1-19%) MARKET PUBLIC MARKET PUBLIC 
0.222 -0.426   no union    
(1.51) (1.34)   
0.127 0.235   30-49%      
(0.59) (0.93)   
0.404 0.338   50-69% 
(1.98)+ (1.35)   
0.287 0.109   70-89% 
(1.44) (0.43)   
0.900 0.352   90-100% 
(3.53)** (1.33)   
multi-union (ref. single union)     
  0.157 -0.540 no union 
  (1.39) (1.96)+ 
  0.361 0.221 2+ unions, with joint 
bargaining   (2.01)* (1.12) 
  0.521 0.296 2+ unions, separate bargaining 
  (2.63)* (1.33) 
other explanatory variables     
-0.0039 0.0009 -0.0042 0.0003 female % 
(1.85)+ (0.23) (1.99)* (0.08) 
-0.217 -0.340 -0.211 -0.352 monopoly position 
(1.34) (2.11)* (1.27) (2.28)* 
-1.620 -0.643 -1.539 -0.475 Constant 
(3.53)** (0.90) (5.05)** (0.70) 
 
Notes:  Coefficients are univariate probit models with robust variance estimator; t-
statistics (absolute values) shown in parentheses.  Estimates for control variables not 
shown.  Controls are: log of lagged size, head office, region (11 dummies), age of 
workplace (four bands), industry (11 dummies for market sector, 9 dummies for 
private sector), form of ownership (four dummies, market sector only).  N=1357 for 
market sector; N=563 for public sector. Significance: + 10%, * 5%, ** 1%. 
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Table 5:  Effects on JSGs of unionisation and other explanatory variables 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
density (ref. 1-19%) MARKET PUBLIC MARKET PUBLIC 
0.534 -0.509   no union    
(2.23)* (1.51)   
0.562 -0.117   30-49%      
(1.77)+ (0.41)   
0.851 -0.093   50-69% 
(2.90)** (0.35)   
1.226 -0.172   70-89% 
(3.89)** (0.63)   
1.644 0.160   90-100% 
(4.89)** (0.55)   
multi-union (ref. single union)     
   0.026 -0.256 no union 
  (0.17) (0.87) 
  0.655 0.654 2+ unions, with joint 
bargaining   (2.73)* (3.28)** 
  0.367 0.285 2+ unions, separate bargaining 
  (1.49) (1.21) 
other explanatory variables     
0.0068 -0.0075 0.0057 -0.0076 female % 
(2.42)* (2.08)* (2.11)* (2.16)* 
 0.077 0.070  0.036 0.087 monopoly position 
(0.29) (0.41) (0.14) (0.52) 
-2.747 0.957 -2.052 0.854 Constant 
(5.83)** (1.27) (4.77)** (1.21) 
 
Notes:  Coefficients are from univariate probit models with robust variance estimator; 
t-statistics (absolute values) shown in parentheses.  Estimates for control variables not 
shown.  Controls are: log of lagged size, head office, region (11 dummies), age of 
workplace (four bands), industry (11 dummies for market sector, 9 dummies for 
public sector), form of ownership (four dummies, market sector only).  N=1357 for 
market sector; N=563 for public sector. Significance: + 10%, * 5%, ** 1%. 
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Table 6:  Marginal effects of the union variables 
 
 WWJCs JSGs 
density (ref. 1-
19%) 
MARKET PUBLIC MARKET PUBLIC 
no union    0.075 -0.145 0.020 -0.129 
 (1.58) (1.39) (2.78) (1.54) 
30-49%      0.042 0.091 0.022 -0.035 
 (0.59) (0.93) (1.38) (0.41) 
50-69% 0.143 0.133 0.046 -0.028 
 (1.96) (1.37) (2.15) (0.35) 
70-89% 0.099 0.042 0.100 -0.050 
 (1.44) (0.43) (2.78) (0.61) 
90-100% 0.339 0.138 0.198 0.053 
 (3.59) (1.35) (3.01) (0.56) 
multi-union (ref. 
single union) 
    
no union 0.054 -0.184 0.0017 -0.047 
 (1.42) (2.16) (0.17) (0.93) 
2+ unions, with 
joint bargaining 
0.131 0.087 0.076 0.189 
 (1.94) (1.13) (2.02) (3.59) 
2+ unions, 
separate 
bargaining 
0.193 0.117 0.033 0.070 
 (2.53) (1.34) (1.22) (1.21) 
 
Notes:  Effects for union density and for multi-union variable are estimated in 
different models (see text, and Tables 4 and 5).  Each dummy’s marginal effect on 
Pr(y=1) is evaluated at the means of the other variables.  The z-statistics (absolute 
values) are shown in parentheses. 
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